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A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

The Man Who Lost His Head

JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

Pacifism and the Atomic Bomb

HANS KARL GUNTHER

Germany: Over-Full Employment

WILHELM ROEPKE

Articles and Reviews by ·····E. v. KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN
WILLMOORE KENDALL · RUSSELL KIRK · REVILO OLIVER
ANTHONY LEJEUNE · FRANCES BECK W. H. CHAMBERLIN

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The WEEK

● Senator Byrd has called for reducing the budget by five billion. NATIONAL REVIEW stays, and raises him five.

● What the new science of macroeconomics (heap big word for seeing things in totals) tells us is that the Gross National Product for 1956 rose to $412 billion—which was $22 billion over the figure for 1955. Macroeconomics also vouchsafes the information that one-half of the $22 billion increase represented a real gain in production, while the other half was merely an inflationary markup. What macro etc. doesn't tell you and me as individuals is a) what last year's inflation is destined to do to this year's production and b) just what good an increase in productivity does when it is taxed away from people in bigger and bigger amounts. Macroeconomics sounds grand in the economics textbooks, but microeconomics is far more informative about what people actually get with the money they take home.

● Recent studies of consumer debt trends display the vulnerable economic background to which the stock market has been nervously reacting in recent weeks. All indices of personal debt are now at their all-time highs. Total personal debt was $162.7 billion by the end of 1956, up $15.8 billion during the year, and $128.9 billion for the decade since 1946. The present total represents 56.8 per cent of personal disposal income. Of this huge sum, $99 billion was home mortgage debt, equal to 34.5 per cent of disposable income, as against $18.5 billion (12.3 per cent of the then annual disposable income) in 1945. Consumer debt on installment purchases has reached $31.5 billion, up from only $4.5 billion in 1939, and a mere $2.4 billion in 1945. It is obvious that a comparatively small downturn in employment and income could quickly transform this inflated fiscal bubble into an economic millstone.

● Adlai, the Alliterative Addict, is 'ard at his Antics Again. Specifically, he has just spun off some more of his phascinatin' phrases about "Madison Avenue diplomacy" going from "brink to brink and blunder to blunder." Despite the brummagem quality of the rhetoric (after all, it's just the old circus press agent's trick of never mentioning an elephant when you can speak of Ponderous Pachyderms or Bulky Behemoths), there was too much truth for comfort in the recent Stevensonian remarks about the Administration's failure to take time by the forelock at Suez and in Hungary. The only substantive defect in Mr. Stevenson's speech was his failure to outline a "crea-

tive" Democratic alternative to Republican Brink-and-Blunderism. As Adlai might have said (but didn't), after Aching with Acheson and Masticating Marshall's Mush, we haven't much hope that the Democrats might be any less a Disaster than Dulles. (Not that the Difference is Demonstrably Discernible.)

● Item from the bitter-left *New Statesman and Nation*: "Our Correspondent in Bombay writes: [Socialist Kyaw Nyein], now deputy premier of Burma and responsible for economic planning, told the Asian Socialist Conference here that in an attempt to avoid foreign loans and grants with political strings, Burma tried to get foreign currency by increasing the export of agricultural products. This led to the question of planned agriculture, for without increased production Burma could not go ahead with a Socialist economy. Almost at once, the Burmese leaders discovered how conservative peasants can be. Said Kyaw Nyein sadly: 'We expected them to be happy after land reform.' But he admitted that state plans for increased production left them 'not as happy as they were before.' Dangers of inflation then threatened the young government. To put this right it was suggested they should spend less, consume less, tax more. 'But if we do this,' said Kyaw Nyein, 'the people shout and say that even the colonial power did not treat us so badly.'" Watch your language, Kyaw!

● The National Convention of the Communist Party of the United States has ended with a general blurring of all issues in a series of compromise resolutions, and a selection of committee members that means a continuing battle for the party machinery. The pre-Convention discussion showed that a majority of the membership was staggered by the de-Stalinization disclosures and the Hungarian events. The depth of the disturbance was reflected in the fact that this was the first Communist Party convention since 1930 in which there were divided votes. But the disturbed majority failed to understand that American Communists can break with Moscow only by also breaking with Communism. The old-time stalwarts of the inner-party apparatus, fronted by W. Z. Foster, were able to play successfully for time, to hold the party together, and to come out of the convention in an organizational position giving them a good chance to re-establish 100 per cent control. Mr. Frank S. Meyer, of our editorial staff, will testify before the Senate's Subcommittee on Internal Security next week on developments at the National Convention. We shall summarize his analysis.

● Things may be going badly for the Eisenhower-Dulles foreign policy in London and Paris and Jerusalem and even Tokyo. Happily, however, some of what we lose on the swings we gain back on the roundabouts, and we are glad to note that things are looking up in Addis Ababa. The "long, bleak period during which Emperor Haile Selassie nearly took the road to neutralism," an American newsman writes from there, is at an end; the Emperor, once "incensed" because the U.S. did not consult him about the Aswan high dam, once "disenchanted at the paucity of U.S. military aid," is now getting himself back into a good humor with us—so that, let joy be unconfined, "U.S. prestige in Ethiopia is on the upsurge again."

● The pundits are scratching their heads over the appointment of Andrei A. Gromyko as Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Does it mean a return to "Stalinism"? Or is it compatible with former Foreign Minister

For the Record

The American Association of School Administrators —probably the most influential educational lobby in the country—finds President Eisenhower's school construction program "totally inadequate." The AASA says the federal government should contribute from 3.5 to 6 billion dollars annually to the public schools system. . . . The American Association of University Women proclaimed last week that it was "totally opposed to federal control of schools" and in the next breath endorsed the federal school construction program. . . . Senator Neuberger of Oregon has introduced a bill which would give the federal government the power to bar outdoor advertising along any state or local road built with federal money. It suggests also that the federal government regulate eating places and filling stations along all such roads. . . . It is reliably reported that State Department officials believe there will be, in the near future, a softening of the U.S. trade embargo against Red China under pressure from Great Britain, Japan and West Germany. . . . Chairman Whitten of a House subcommittee on appropriations favors the sale of surplus U.S. farm goods to the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. . . . The Senate Judiciary Committee has requested immunity from prosecution for Harold Glasser, a former Treasury Department economist, and three other witnesses who recently appeared before it in Hawaii in order to force them to testify. The Judiciary Committee is the first congressional group to avail itself of the immunity law. . . . The newly proclaimed "independence" of the American Communist Party from Moscow has been hailed by *Pravda*, the newspaper of the Soviet Communist Party. In its report on the recent Communist Party convention in New York, *Pravda* praised the "unity, preservation and consolidation" of the U.S. party.

Shepilov's statement that peaceful coexistence remains "the cornerstone of the foreign policy of the Soviet state"? Whatever it portends, one thing remains plain: there's always room in Russia for a good hatchet man at the top. Since it was the essence of Stalinism to wield the hatchet whenever there was anything to be gained by it, the pundits don't have to look far to draw a valid conclusion from the promotion of one of Molotov's old gang.

● The Indian Socialist Party, led spiritually by Jayaprakash Narayan and organizationally by Asoka Mehta, has formed a united front with the Indian Communist Party for the election now in process. Our entire Socialist and Liberal Left has for years had nothing but admiring words for the Indian Socialists—whose leaders, along with many of our prominent Liberal intellectuals, belong to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, which is supported by millions of American dollars. NATIONAL REVIEW has been bitterly assailed by the Left whenever we suggest that Marxists have a kind of political tropism for each other, making it difficult for a Socialist, no matter how anti-Communist he thinks himself, to resist Communists when they come bearing united front gifts. But we have yet to read in any organ of the Left a comment on this Socialist-Communist electoral marriage in India. Does even the *New Leader* judge it news not fit to print? And how does the Congress for Cultural Freedom like it?

● *How to Perpetuate the Memory of One's Friends Department.* "[From the *New York Times*, Sunday, February 17] A $50,000 gift made in 1955 to Sweet Briar College by John Hay Whitney, newly appointed Ambassador to Great Britain, and his wife, Mrs. Betsey Cushing Whitney, has been designated the Betsey Cushing and John Hay Whitney Professorship in Physics. The gift was made in honor of their friend, Dr. Connie M. Guion of New York."

● Senator William Jenner chided American conservatives in a speech last week for misdirecting and dissipating their fire. Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower, he said, are not men with the courage or insight to resist the collectivist trend nourished by a bureaucracy that feeds on one-fourth the nation's income. Since the legislatures alone have the power to limit the bureaucracy's funds, conservatives should concentrate on electing and supporting anti-collectivist representatives. A congressman without loyal support is "like an ambassador all dressed up in uniform and gold braid, whose country has been taken over by subversion. He must go over to the enemy or resign." It is good to be able to know which alternative Senator Jenner would take should he ever be faced with the choice.

● Want to know how to wash a brain? To save a soul? To exorcise somebody's neurosis? To use the third degree on some tightlipped fellow who knows something you want to know? The book for you is William Sargant's *Battle for the Mind,* which (according to *Publishers' Weekly*) is a "detailed account of the psychological factors underlying brain-washing, religious conversion, psychoanalysis, and police-methods (bet you didn't know, up to now, that the same factors underlie all four) and lets you in on all there is to know about "techniques of getting people to change their minds." You will, however, have to wait a while for it. Doubleday announces that in order to allow for "more intensive advertising promotion," publication has been postponed until May 23. Tantalizingly, it fails to say whether the promotion will itself employ all those techniques.

On Aiding the Enemy

The five Poles whose mission it is to get money from the United States are here. Before they are through, they will have forced Washington to do something—not much, maybe, but something—about a number of problems, political, philosophical and juridical, with which, in characteristic fashion, our leaders have contentedly coexisted, funking the challenge of thinking them through.

Number one: Are we to help the Gomulka government? The answer involves arriving at a prior conclusion: Is Gomulka on *our* side or on *their* side? It seems to us that Gomulka is on the side of the enemy, as Tito is; but is this clear? Not, evidently, to the dozen public figures who are calling for abundant aid, designed to drive Gomulka into Western arms. Senator Knowland, on the other hand, flatly opposes aid for so "untrustworthy a government." President Eisenhower, as one would expect, has taken the middle course: he has called for a "limited amount" of aid. Specifically, for $100 million worth of credit with which to buy wheat, cotton, fats, oils, fertilizer, farm and mining machinery. (*I.e.*, no jet planes.)

Number two: Who is going to make the decision whether Gomulka gets help? Theoretically, Congress; in fact—unless Congress were to assert itself beyond its disposition, these days, to do—the Administration. The President has so much discretionary power in so many areas that, with a little resourceful finagling here and there, he can summon to his service a hundred million or so any day of the week—and who will stop him? Will Congress probe the political problem involved—a near-omnipotent executive who can reallocate funds, dispose of farm surpluses, license trade with the enemy by merely calling him a friend? More likely, Congress will persuade itself that foreign aid is an arm of foreign policy, a field constitutionally

pre-empted by the Chief Executive. We shall see.

Number three: At the philosophical level, what is the proper attitude for the United States when it confronts mass starvation in an enemy country? Should humanitarian impulses prevail, especially given the fact that they are sure *not* to prevail in the enemy's mother country? Or to look at the question pragmatically, do humanitarian policies bring home the bacon? Do men and women whose hunger we sate end up feeling grateful to us? If so, does their gratitude find effective political expression?

The five-man Polish mission will, predictably, perform smoothly in Washington. Unless our leaders sit down and think about the problems involved, the Communists will walk all over us.

"The Senator doesn't want to answer that question. He wants to sleep on it."

General Charmer

We did not, last November, go along with the idea that we would all be safer with an able military man in the White House. But a lot of people—including some of our Best Friends—did go along with it, maybe (who knows?) enough to make the difference between defeat and victory for Dwight Eisenhower.

The thought that Mr. Eisenhower did not have even *that* claim to the Presidency is, therefore, almost too terrible to contemplate. But so also is the thought that an expert might be wrong about something. Under the circumstances, there's nothing for it but to take judicial cognizance—which we herewith do—of British military expert Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke's judgment, as expressed in his book published last week.

The Viscount contends that "strategy, tactics, and command were never Eisenhower's strong points." "Where he shone," Alanbrooke continues, "was in his ability . . . to get the very best out of an inter-Allied force." That is, as a diplomat capable of charming the birds out of the trees for any purpose he happens to have in hand.

It would be interesting to know whether Alanbrooke is wondering, as we are, whether the diplomat's skills in handling allies are equally serviceable in handling the enemy; whether, in Lord Alanbrooke's judgment, General Eisenhower's skills are precisely those we need in order to foil the Soviet Union's designs on us and our allies? (Incidentally, Alanbrooke surprised no one around our office when he added, "From everything I saw of him, I put General MacArthur down as the greatest general of the last war.")

The Cradle and the Grave

"Statistics," according to Communist doctrine, "are a weapon in the class war"; and we may add that the same can be said of a lack of statistics. The elaborate Soviet census of 1937 proved displeasing to the Kremlin, and was simply thrown out. Some sort of census was taken in 1939. Since then, nothing. (Now they are announcing a new census some time in the vague future.)

The reasons for the Soviet coyness about population figures are plain. No quotas in the Five Year Plans have been missed more widely than those for Baby Production and for Lengthened Life Span. A genuine census would show the gap between the actual Soviet population and the levels predicted from Marxian doctrine, which holds that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" must inevitably expand population (like all other "means of production") at a rate far above that of the decadent "imperialist powers." But malnutrition, slave labor, war, crowded living space and the dreary hopelessness of Communist society have resulted in fewer babies and shorter lives than Marxism deduces. In contrast, the population of the United States has been leaping ahead much beyond all demographic expectations, to the bewildered dismay of Soviet scientists.

The slow rate of population growth in the Soviet Union is proved by mathematical analysis of partial data that are available, and has been indirectly admitted by Soviet publications. An honest census

would focus world attention on the weaknesses that follow therefrom for the whole Soviet enterprise, which requires ever-swelling masses of human fodder to supply its labor force and its armies. On this as on every topic, the Communist myth withers at the touch of truth.

The Costly Pride of Walter Reuther

We view the struggle between the United Automobile Workers and the Kohler Company as crucial. As we have said, it involves the question whether labor union bureaucracies can, through the use of violence, political pressure, and public intimidation, reduce to impotence the management function. That, it is necessary to say again and again, is what the fight is about. We have not heard it seriously argued in any responsible quarter that the UAW challenged the Kohler Company in order to rescue Kohler employees from industrial thralldom—the Kohler Company having, in its treatment of its employees, continually surpassed standards acceptable to the UAW in other plumbing companies in Wisconsin and elsewhere.

The affront of Herbert V. Kohler was not to enlightened industrial standards, but to the pride of a ravenously ambitious socialist who will settle for nothing less than domination of American industry. Last week it was revealed that in addition to such intangibles as smashed windows, bloodied noses, and broken bones, Walter Reuther has spent, in his passion to humble Kohler, *twenty million dollars*. Notwithstanding, the Kohler Company is said to be operating at 85 per cent of capacity, reflecting—or let us look at it that way, and rejoice—the determination by the majority of the community not to succumb to the intimidations of the violent predators of our society.

Under the Rug

There is complete agreement between Moscow and Washington on at least one point: that Hungary's Freedom Revolution ought not to have happened. And so strong is their conviction thereon that the two are making a massive combined effort to persuade themselves, each other, and the world, that it never *did* happen.

For Moscow, "the Hungarian October" has a potential of disaster. The Hungarian Freedom Fighters struck at two essential and irreplaceable Communist myths: the myth that Communism, once in power, is invincible; and the myth that Communism, given control of education, can win the souls of the younger generation. But if a nation of a mere 10,000,000 population, alone and unaided, can openly defy the might of the Soviet Empire, blow up its tanks and actually win freedom for a number of days, then Communist rule is mortally vulnerable and, assuming an aggressive Western policy, could collapse. And the lead in this effrontery was taken by young people, all of whose education had been in Communist hands.

Therefore Moscow must try to convince its own subjects and the world that the Hungarian revolution was never attempted and simply did not take place. There was merely—as Moscow must and does rewrite history—an adventure by a handful of Western agents, fascists and "Horthyites" who succeeded in briefly provoking a few unstable students and workers.

At Washington, those in charge of American foreign policy are also determined to erase the Hungarian revolution from the historical record. Some years ago the American government, guided by CIA's estimate, adopted the thesis of George Kennan that the situation in Eastern Europe (that is, Communist control of Eastern Europe) was settled "for good or ill" (as Mr. Kennan curiously put it). After the abortive East German outbreak in 1953, this estimate was reaffirmed. The policy conclusion was drawn to abandon any perspective of genuine liberation. It is presumed that this conclusion was communicated to Khrushchev at Geneva. American hopes and plans were restricted to the possible development of mild East European Titoisms that would be friendly to Moscow, and thus in no way threatening to the Communist status quo.

But the Hungarian revolution destroyed the American no less than the Soviet myths. Moreover (and in Washington no consideration could be more decisive) the facts about the Hungarian revolution, if clearly and widely known, could and probably would destroy the jobs of those in high places who were responsible for the wholly false estimate of the East European situation, and the wholly incorrect policy toward it. This means, to begin at the most conspicuous level: Allen Dulles, who as head of CIA is responsible for the false estimate; and his brother, John Foster Dulles, who as Secretary of State is—apart from the President himself, whose job is constitutionally guaranteed through 1960—responsible for the policy decision.

To avoid alike the exposure of the past and the need for a drastic revision for the future, Washington, too, is rewriting history. The Hungarian "incident," we shall learn from our own spokesmen, was only an irregular uprising set off by some political blunders and an accidental provocation by the security police. Nothing in East Europe has changed. There is no reason to alter the old estimate or the old policy.

At the end of January, the State Department issued

secret instructions to all relevant individuals and offices, ordering them henceforth to end all references to "the puppet Kádár government." From now on, it is to be "the Kádár government," or simply "the Hungarian government." Because, of course, if the Kádár gang is the genuine government of Hungary, then there was no revolution in October. And if the Kádár government is legitimate, then the Soviet military action in November, since it was requested by Kádár, is not an aggression and not a crime, but friendly aid to a small ally.

Thus goes the political logic of the position which the State Department is now adopting.

Who's Kidding Whom?

On the order of the President, Budget Director Percival Brundage has requested every government Department and agency to review its commercial and industrial activities. (According to the Hoover Commission, there were 19,321 such activities as of last May.)

Mr. Brundage has instructed the various Departments to report in by April 15 on which of these can and should be dropped. Judgment is supposed to be based on the following statement of Administration policy: "The Federal Government will not start or carry on any commercial-industrial activity to provide a service or product for its own use if such product or service can be procured from private enterprise through ordinary business channels."

Bravo! But will not the Department heads be mystified by Mr. Brundage's bizarre understanding of his rule? For the budget he submitted to Congress three weeks earlier called for constructing huge new government-owned power plants in the TVA system, for changing from private to public development of Oregon's John Day dam and power projects, for new government activity in finance, housing, medicine and education. One can only hope that the Department heads take Mr. Brundage's principles more seriously than he does.

What of Tomorrow?

Mr. Stewart Alsop reports that the Democratic Party is desperate. Or, in his own words, "absolutely desperate." Not for the reasons advanced last summer by Democratic orators and jobseekers, who bemoaned America's march down the road to perdition under the Republican banner, but for exactly the opposite reason: the Republicans are doing just what the Democrats would themselves do were they in power. And this leaves the Democrats without an issue. "The Eisenhower Administration," Mr. Alsop notes, "in fact has now consciously accepted the basic thesis of the dominant wing of the Democratic Party—that the Federal government is responsible for the general welfare . . . Four years ago, when the Eisenhower Administration took office with a domestic program which differed in no important respect from the program of the late Senator Taft, such a flat, unequivocal acceptance of the basic thesis of the welfare state would have been considered a major heresy."

It is no longer so considered, nor should be, is the burden of the remainder of Mr. Alsop's column; and on this point the overwhelming majority of the nation's conservatives, who four years ago cursed the welfare state and today curse NATIONAL REVIEW and others who contend that they were right the first time, are agreed.

We have often drawn political and economic conclusions from the relentless march of the Eisenhower Administration to statism, and will not go over the ground again here. We wish to say a word, only a word, about the philosophical implications of the relapse into relativism of Mr. Alsop and the conservative community. Our position is that heresy is heresy, yesterday, today, and tomorrow, and that the nature of heresy is not changed by the passage of time, by automation, by the farm vote, by George Gallup, or by anybody or anything else.

Those who four years ago opposed political and economic centralization as constrictive of individual freedom and damaging to the economy, were eternally, not transiently, right. In our time, relativism has triumphed. It is a strange and accommodating god. Under it the same people, saying much the same thing, glide with the same party from one set of postulates over to a totally contradictory set—without giving it a second thought. Under relativism we can drift into rigid socialism of a kind Marx himself would not have had the perversity to quarrel with. For those who, in such an age, will show themselves nostalgic for the age of Eisenhower there will be epithets of "Reactionary! Unreconstructible! Paleolithic!"—the same epithets directed, these days, at those who say Taft was right, and Eisenhower dead, dead wrong.

Next week NATIONAL REVIEW will devote its entire feature section to a provocative article by Medford Evans, which will take the form of "An Open Letter to Dr. Oppenheimer." Dr. Evans, author of *The Secret War for the A-Bomb*, served for eight years in personnel work with the Atomic Energy Commission, ending as its chief of training.

Letter from London

ANTHONY LEJEUNE

Fighting the Wrong War

Other matters, such as the Rent Act and the failure of Conservatives to be Conservative, may carry more weight with the voters in the by-elections which have come to plague us at the moment, but from a long-term point of view quite the most important political moves being made are concerned with defense.

Mr. Macmillan's hope of success at the next general election depends on his ability to give, before then, real financial relief to an over-taxed nation. Relief can only come from reductions in defense expenditure. Mr. Sandys is the spearhead of the new Government's attack. He was invested with great powers and sent to America to start negotiations at the most practical level.

For defense nowadays is not only a domestic issue. One partner's decisions may affect the safety of the whole alliance. Unilateral moves, such as Germany's hesitance in building up her army and France's transfer of troops to North Africa, have already weakened the structure of NATO, though there may have been urgent domestic reasons for them. Britain is pledged to keep the equivalent of four divisions and a tactical air force in Europe. Any reduction in this force might not only be dangerous in itself but start a chain reaction. General Norstad is very unhappy about the proposed cuts and, during his visit to London, allowed himself a good deal of plain speaking. The NATO forces, he said, are not yet "strong enough to hold" and any further reduction in their real fighting potential would be most unsafe.

This is an uncomfortable assessment, particularly as the treaty makes the Supreme Commander sole judge of whether each member nation is maintaining its proper contribution. There is some consolation in knowing that General Norstad is a tough fighter at the conference table as well as on the battlefield; and, of course, there are arguments on the other side. Sizable cuts in the "tail" can be made without impairing the fighting capacity of the British divisions. General Sir Richard Gale, just retired from his post as Commander in Chief of the British forces in Germany, puts the waste of personnel at something well over a quarter of the 80,000 men there. More fundamental, perhaps, is the undoubted fact that to strengthen Britain's economy, even by taking calculated military risks, is to strengthen the potential of the Western world.

But NATO would not be the first grand alliance in which the soldiers worked well together only to be torpedoed by their own politicians. Almost every war which the democracies have fought began with a desperate period when the practical men struggled to clear away the mess left by jealousy, self-interest and compromise. Next time we may not be allowed any such period.

If economy cuts are made sensibly, if they result in closer cooperation between allies, if they produce a tighter, more professional army, they may be intrinsically valuable. But in all the discussion about defense—and there's been a lot in Britain during the last few weeks—there still seems no clear agreement on the sort of strategy being contemplated. If an immediate full-scale atomic war is the only foreseeable kind of conflict, then certainly territorial forces and week-end reserve fliers cost more than they are likely to be worth. But the history of the past ten years seems to show that, in the first instance at least, a succession of local wars is much more likely. For that sort of situation you need mobile professional task-forces, backed by a cushion of reserves to take over the defense of your bases. The Communists have made great gains since 1945 without using nuclear weapons or committing a single Russian soldier against Western troops; why should they abandon such a successful strategy unless they are panicked into doing so?

The Suez affair showed how ill-prepared Britain is for limited operations of this kind. The failure there was largely political—soldiers can't fight with their hands tied—and partly the result of a global strategy which has strung our forces out across the world and keeps them engaged in difficult mopping-up operations from Malaya to Kenya.

The Communist advance through Asia was made possible, or at any rate greatly facilitated, because so few of its opponents seemed to understand what was happening. In Korea, in Indo-China, in half a dozen smaller trouble spots, Western armies were defeated because they tried to fight the wrong sort of war. Mao Tse-tung's rules of "mobile warfare" are available for anybody to study, but nobody seems to study them except the Communists. When the representatives of SEATO meet in Canberra soon, they will have a grave situation to consider. If the Communists should turn on the heat in Southeast Asia, they would find no "mobile striking force" to oppose them.

Underlying the Western failure to produce a comprehensive strategy is a stubborn reluctance to accept the root fact of our time: that the world is at war. However much he may seem to twist and turn, no true Communist has ever abandoned or, while remaining a Communist, ever can abandon the goal of world conquest. This is the touchstone of his ethics, the key to his diplomacy. And the Communists now rule a third of the earth's surface.

This is a total war in a new sense. It is fought, not only on battlefields, but at international conferences, in business firms, in trade unions, in newspapers, in men's minds. We have to fight it at each of these levels. If, for instance, we save money by modernizing our fleet, we cannot argue that a further saving should be made by reducing our "information" services by a comparable amount. The war must be considered as a whole.

The West is always losing the battle of ideas, because we refuse to fight it. We look, instead, for a change of heart in the enemy, a rift among his leaders, a lightening in his regime—anything rather than face the situation as it is.

The Man Who Lost His Head

Having invented "consumer capitalism," Robert Owen missed the point of his own creation and wandered off into the blind alley of socialism

JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

"History," said Henry Ford, "is bunk." The expression was crude, the sentiment palpably untrue. But if Henry Ford had limited himself to saying that the deductions which men draw from history are usually bunk he would have hit the nail on the head.

Consider, for example, the curious life of Robert Owen. As an historical figure, Owen is a paradox. He was one of the early capitalists, yet he is known and revered today as the founder of British Socialism. This Welshman who quit the profitable manufacture of cotton textiles to befriend the working man is considered the father of the labor movement, the patron saint of Fabianism, the great instigator and energizer of modern State-directed "planning." Yet if anyone ever misread his own genius, it was Owen. He completely lost his sense of direction when he ceased to be a capitalist doer and tried to become a Great Brain for the Socialist Uplift.

Forgotten at all of the partisan rallies which periodically sing the praises of Owen, the collectivist, Owen, the labor leader, or Owen, the "planner," is the fact of the man's life as a practical businessman. Yet it was as a businessman, one of the best of his time, that he made his only worthwhile discovery. In the early days of the Industrial Revolution, at his New Lanark mills in Scotland, Robert Owen carried out a great experiment—a distinctly capitalist experiment, conducted without recourse to State aid and within a framework of purely voluntary action.

In its own time the experiment was so successful that it had thousands posting over the muddy roads of England and Scotland to look at what went on in Owen's seven-story brick mills on the wooded banks of the Clyde. The Grand Duke Nicholas, son of the Czar of all the Russias, was so impressed with what he saw that he offered land in Russia on which to settle two million of England's surplus population, the sole condition being that Owen himself would come and direct the émigrés at work. Yet no one seems to have drawn the logical conclusion from the New Lanark experiment, least of all Owen himself.

Innovations in Management

What Owen had discovered was nothing less than the way to make capitalism work. The discovery was certainly not his alone—other early nineteenth century industrialists, now forgotten, knew as well as Owen that there was no long-term profit in grinding the faces of the poor. One of those early industrialists who chose to flout the so-called "iron law of wages" was David Dale, Owen's father-in-law, who had originally built the New Lanark mills. A kindly and religious man who liked on occasion to hold forth in an independent Presbyterian pulpit, Dale followed the custom of his times in utilizing the labor of pauper children from the workhouses. We think this monstrously cruel today, forgetting that in the years before the cotton mill owners started contracting to take foundling labor, the paupers were left in the workhouses to perish wholesale from disease and starvation. Dale employed 500 children, 200 of them under the age of ten, and he apparently considered himself a humanitarian in doing so. He made a beginning at cleaning up the system of pauper apprenticeship, giving girls and boys different rooms to sleep in, allowing them time off for meals, and providing school instruction for anyone who wanted to learn reading, writing and "ciphering" after supper.

Apparently Dale's kindness, which was distinctly relative to its time and place, paid off, for his factory became known in distant Manchester as something new and better in cotton mill management. Robert Owen, the Boy Wonder who came out of a linen draper's shop to become a factory manager at the age of twenty, decided to go north and see the New Lanark marvel for himself. In Glasgow he met Dale's daughter Caroline and fell in love with her. But when he was introduced to the father, it was not the girl's hand he asked for. What Owen was after was nothing less than the old man's mills.

Impressed with his young visitor's characteristically beguiling effrontery, Dale yielded up his factory as soon as Owen had found partners to put up the money for the purchase. (Later on the brash young man got around to asking for the daughter.) Not satisfied with his father-in-law's own innovations in the handling of personnel, Owen started shifting things around. He stopped the importation of pauper apprentices, and refused to employ any children under the age of ten. Though the Clydeside workers of the time were a "wretched society" (to use Owen's own description of what he found in New Lanark), they responded once Owen had convinced them that he did not intend to tamper unduly with their personal lives. Owen won his rude Scots individualists to the idea of a company store when he offered them "pure whisky" for sale as well as cheap food and clothing. He added a second story to the workmen's houses, cleaned up the town's dungheaps, paved the streets, and went into the coal business to keep his employees from being gouged on fuel. He offered medical attention to all, deducting one-sixtieth of a man's wages to make this possible. At the same time he raised the wage scale and shortened the hours. In the mills, over each operative's station, he hung a cube, with black, blue, yellow and

white sides. The position of the cube denoted an individual's working behavior, black being turned out for poor performance, blue for indifferent, yellow for good and white for excellent. Nobody at New Lanark was punished for recalcitrance, nobody was spoken to harshly. The "silent monitor" alone told the story and effected the necessary discipline.

Owen seems to have carried his partners along with him on most of his innovations. Inside the factory he anticipated many of the morale-building discoveries which are now associated with the name of Professor Elton Mayo. But when he turned his mind to establishing a model school system for the village of New Lanark he met with indignant protests. Owen had his own ideas about education; he believed in "visual aids," in teaching without the birch rod, and in adding dancing and music to the more conventional curriculum of the Three R's. He also insisted on special instruction for girls in knitting and sewing. Furthermore, he was adamant about keeping even the ten- and eleven-year olds out of the factory and in school for part of the day.

These "advanced ideas" led to continual friction, and Owen, in a dramatic showdown, finally offered to buy out his partners or to sell them his own share of New Lanark. This was in 1809, ten years after he had first come to Scotland. When the partners decided they wanted to pull out, Owen offered the sum of £84,000 for the property, or some £24,000 more than had been paid for it in 1799. When the books were examined, it developed that the business, in addition to paying 5 per cent on the original capital for ten years, had also earned £60,000. Moreover, New Lanark, in an early version of the "annual wage," had managed to keep its workers on the payroll during a prolonged period of shutdown at a cost of £7,000.

All of this seems to establish the profitableness of Owen's methods. He raised the £84,000, entered into a new partnership—and later bought out his new partners at an auction which priced the mills at £114,000. New Lanark, in the midst of the post-Napoleonic economic upheavals, continued to be a profitable enterprise, and Owen continued to carry out his newfangled notions about education and about luring productivity from workers by providing them with decent surroundings and good wages.

Flight into the Blue

What should have been a valid generalization from all this? Clearly, Owen should have deduced from his experience that the most effective way to reform an industrial society would be to persuade mill owners in general to follow the New Lanark prescription. At one point Owen did hit upon the basic postulate of modern "consumer capitalism"; he noted, speaking of the working class, that "these, in consequence of their numbers, are the greatest consumers." Yet Owen couldn't see that he had the elements of a universal system at New Lanark. Instead of preaching the gospel of improved unit efficiency via higher wages and shorter hours to the capitalists of Manchester, Owen, at the first hint of post-Napoleonic recession, took flight into the wild blue. He began thinking in socialist terms. He concocted the idea of his famous Villages of Cooperation—a system under which the State, or the county, would buy up land on which to settle the unemployed in government-sponsored enterprises. And instead of offering an increasingly efficient industrial system as the key to employment, he envisaged a "spade agriculture" (shades of Faulkner's "Plowman's Folly"!) which would dispense with the plow.

Meanwhile Owen became a money crank as well as a socialist. He suggested that "labor notes" be substituted for money. He advocated price fixing, with the prices based on the units of labor power going into specific kinds of goods. This, he said, would wipe out "bargaining and speculation." His ideas were grounded in a pre-Marxian labor theory of value. Owen scarcely noticed that he had described "manual labor, *properly directed,*" as "the source of all wealth." The italics are mine—and the fact that Owen thought very little of his own qualifying phrase was an insult to himself as the "proper director" of manual labor at the New Lanark mills. After all, the difference between New Lanark and other British mills resided in a single thing—the superior management provided by Robert Owen.

As Owen grew older he became more and more of a hopeless Utopian. He became bored with New Lanark, and gave up his flourishing business in textiles to found a socialist colony in America, at New Harmony, Indiana. New Harmony was an utter fiasco, yet the failure meant nothing to Owen. He returned to England from the banks of the Wabash to put himself at the disposal of the British labor movement. He became the founder of "Owenism," and, as such, he sired practically everything that is debilitating in modern British society. Though Thomas Babington Macaulay, the Whig historian, described Owen as "always a gentle bore," Owenism eventually carried everything before it. Far more than Marx, Robert Owen is the creator of modern British socialism.

As Owenite socialism conquered in England, Americans who had probably never heard of the New Lanark experiment moved toward the creation of what has been called "the American system of production." American economists, skeptical of the "iron law of wages," began preaching the idea that both wages and profits are paid out of production, and that, as unit efficiency increases and as sales are expanded through lower prices, there must be more and more income for everybody, whether worker, manager or stockholder. A hundred years after New Lanark, Henry Ford, a practical mechanic who didn't know enough about history to know whether it was bunk or not, was to carry New Lanarkism to its ultimate conclusion in high wages and massive selling at low prices.

The irony of it all is that the flag of modern "consumer capitalism" could have been nailed to the masthead of the industrialists even at the inception of the industrial system. But Owen, who had the principles of this consumer capitalism staring him in the face at his own mills, failed to realize the potential of what he had developed. Because of a man who lost his head and couldn't read his own hand, the British Empire was doomed to travel all the way to the brink of ruin. History may not be bunk, but there is little hope to be gleaned from its study when the history-makers themselves can't understand their own creative accomplishments.

Letter from the Continent

E. v. KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN

Tensions in Central Europe

The Hungarian developments surprised most analysts who expected that the Soviets would make an honest effort to let Kádár work out some sort of "Polish" solution. This is by no means the case. Kádár, a pistol at the nape of his neck, leads Hungary toward re-Stalinization. This means that hatred is mounting every day. There are rumors that, as soon as "the weather permits," another full-scale rising will take place. The aim, this time, is not to defeat the Red Army (which could not be done anyhow) but to slaughter every AVO man one can get hold of and to wreck the economy. March 15 and April 4 are named as dates by an organization called MUK (*Márciusban Ujból Kezdódik* — "It Starts Again in March").

No one can say how much truth there is in such rumors. Their significance might be that a nation without private property has nothing to lose and that limitless hatred causes indifference to death and a savagery which knows no bounds. If the predicted uprising takes place, the result might be that the Kádár government would ask for full-scale economic help from the West, since Russia would be unable to grant any. The desperate explosion should convince the Kremlin that a country thoroughly determined not to give in to Soviet rule would be but a hopeless liability, a festering sore, an abscess which might infect the entire system. But these calculations, needless to say, rest on the hope that the Kremlin thinks *logically* and knows that to cut losses is a wise step. Yet this sort of wisdom is more often found in the commercial than in the political world.

France's decision to part with the Saar Region can be considered a unique piece of such national foresight. A similar procedure would be advisable for Italy which, in its own interest, should give up the Central Tyrol and thus not only strike the best bargain it can with Austria but also abolish the only frontier in Free Europe which is iniquitous and lacks moral foundation.

Real resistance rises slowly in the South Tyrol. Time bombs have recently exploded in various parts of the region. State Secretary Dr. Gschnitzer, who is Austria's *de facto* Minister of Foreign Affairs, has firmly demanded that Italy either adhere to the Paris Pact or surrender the area. An earlier Austrian note to the Rome government has now been answered, and though the tenor of the reply was polite and even cordial, though concessions have been promised in some minor matters, the Austrian insistence on an end to the organized mass immigration of Italians into the "Autonomous Region," and on the establishment of a mixed commission to watch over the implementation of the Paris Pact, has met with a flat refusal. Interestingly enough it was the Vatican radio which, on the eve of the reply, made a passionate appeal to both the Italian government and the Tyroleans, asking the latter not to resort to terror and the former to go beyond the Paris Pact by acceding to the wishes of the local population.

There is only one human domain where experience amounts to nothing and that is the field of historic experience. We have seen in the past innumerable cases when governments could have saved their position if they had made concessions at the right time and in the right spirit. Yet the result of the bomb explosions in the Central Tyrol was the arrest of leading citizens; thus, the spiral of hatred is mounting south of the Brenner Pass. The arrest of Dr. Volgger, editor in chief of *Dolomiten*, the leading Central Tyrolean paper (a man who had condemned the terrorist acts in the strongest terms), is of less significance in this growing European calamity than the increasing attention given to these events by the German press. An association has been established in Munich with the avowed purpose of helping the Central Tyroleans in their struggle against Italianization. This means that Vienna will have to make desperate efforts, in order not to be outdone by the Germans. And it also means that the Italians are giving every imaginable incentive to a revival of German nationalism.

Whether the Central Tyrolean issue will be injected into the forthcoming German elections is still uncertain, but the contest will definitely be a hot one. A few months ago it seemed as if the Socialists had victory in the bag, but a similar presentiment also prevailed a few months before the *last* German elections. Then Adenauer emerged with a victory bigger than any ever won in a free German election. The Hungarian revolution has been a godsend to "the Old One," and the new social security law has gained sympathies for the CDU in large segments of the population, especially in the lower middle class. It is possible that the CDU will make another move to "bribe" another important group of voters by introducing legislation concerning co-ownership and profit-sharing in industry. At any rate, the Socialist Party finds it increasingly difficult to produce a program which presents a real alternative to Adenauer's political course.

The old Socialist accusation that Adenauer and his party are extremely lukewarm toward reunification with Eastern Germany has been countered with the decision to make Berlin the capital of Germany. This is, at the same time, a gesture to assure the Germans of the Soviet Zone that the Federal Republic will never give them up or forget them. Yet, from a higher historical point of view it is not certain whether this move is very clever. One might discard the colossal material investment which has been made in Bonn, the *Bundesdorf* ("Federal Village"). But certainly the choice of Berlin as the German capital implies a veiled renewal of the Prussian tradition. There is also a strategic disadvantage to it, because, whatever the final boundary between Germany and Poland, Berlin will always be in the "Far East," remote from all great German cultural and industrial centers. Berlin as a capital city might yet prove to be a capital error.

The PRINTED Word

Precious Little if Anything

The Liberal propaganda machine's weary and wearisome *Progressive*, fighting the good fight for a better world in its exposed outpost in Madison, Wisconsin, did the following in its current issue:

—Noted the bonds of fraternity that unite all Liberals everywhere: "Roland E. Wolseley, writer and professor of journalism at Syracuse University, reports that when he was in India he went to see K. Subha Rau, . . . 'one of the outstanding Indian magazine journalists. . . . I found him reading the *Progressive*. This was most reassuring and served as a tie between us' "; made *this* reader feel sort of left out of things.

—Editorially, had at Eisenhower and Dulles something fierce: "The Eisenhower Dulles Doctrine . . . pecks at the periphery of our problem without coming to grips with basic issues"; it was "born of desperation," of the wish to do "something dramatic . . . to muffle criticism that it had been too pacifist-minded in repudiating Israeli and Anglo-French aggression"; there is not a "single current problem or future eventuality that the Administration's proposal . . . could deal with, . . . [except] open Soviet military aggression in the Middle East." The proposal has, in a word, this "fatal weakness": it embodies "no creative proposals for negotiated settlement of the unresolved issues that produced and prolong the conflict." What we really need is a special UN agency to negotiate 1) a "live-and-let-live agreement between Israel and her Arab neighbors," 2) a "settlement of the Suez dispute," and 3) "adoption of a UN development program for a region-wide attack on poverty, disease, and illiteracy." Such thinking is *not*, moreover, "straight out of the ivory tower," for two reasons: 1) "sometime somewhere someone [somehow?] must make a start before the hell bombs start falling," and 2) there is now "persuasive basis for the hope . . . breathtaking in its possibilities . . . [for] an overall . . . negotiated settlement of all major issues between the Soviet camp and the Western world." The USSR might, to be sure, prove hard to persuade about reversing "its present trouble-making role in the Middle East," but "we shall never know until we explore [the possibility]"; let President Eisenhower, therefore, reconsider his "brusquely written" reply to Bulganin's mid-November proposal for a new summit conference.

—Found room, under the title "Fall-out—Can Man Survive?" for the 10,000th ante-raising rehash of the currently available data on the horrors of Strontium 90, and of the Federation of American Scientists' current line on what to do about it; spelled out, in kindergarten-simple language, the fact that "*one bit* of radioactive energy . . . from any suitable source, if it makes one glancing hit against *one gene*, equals *one damaged* gene, perhaps a shattered and twisted gene," and other such marvels of the atomic age; evidenced no concern over the article's failure even to try to answer the question "Can Man Survive?"—the author having been, perhaps, in too great a hurry to begin his sermon: "What is the rationale for a ban or moratorium on testing? The conscience of countless individuals suggests an answer, . . . [and] aside from conscience, the basic argument for a moratorium . . . is that it is in the national interest of all nations. . . . A test-ban could be a great step towards establishing more trust between East and West. . . . There may come . . . a time when . . . the world will be too dangerous for trust."

—Ran a not uninteresting analytical article on the current crisis in the Communist Party of the United States ("The question posed [is] . . . whether Communism can be seriously modified from within, whether it can take a course independent of Moscow"), with, however, these telltale last lines: "It seems certain that American Titoism will develop new forms and new approaches different from those of Yugoslavia, Poland, or Hungary. *American socialists and liberals*"—the italics are mine—"*who will clearly not rush to embrace it* [or to repudiate it either?], *will be watching with profound interest.*"

—Turned Funnyman Milton Mayer loose to re-explain, for anyhow the hundredth time, the wickedness of war: "[Except for the *Progressive*], *The Commonweal* is, I think, the best magazine in America, if one does not count *The Catholic Worker* . . . [But the *Commonweal's*] Ambrosian heel is war. Its editors insist upon reading the Church Fathers, instead of reading what Jesus said to the Father of the Church when the latter went after the centurion's ear. The Church Fathers . . . maintain there is such a thing as a just war"; "What the British and French did [in Port Said] was much worse [than what the Russians did in Budapest], because the British and French are, like us, highly civilized, and the Russians are not."

—Ran a piece on current dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court that arrives at this reassuring conclusion: ". . . all things considered, this is still the best of judicial worlds of which we have any experience."

—Tricked itself into publishing a few lines of good sense (along with a good deal of nonsense) by carrying an article, "Marching Orders for the Political Right," dealing with—and quoting extensively from—Colonel Archibald Roosevelt's *Manual for American Action*, as witness: "Americans have learned the hard way that the only way to fight an unscrupulous and immoral enemy is to throw the polite book of rules out the window and fight fire with fire"; "The anti-Communists are in about the same period of growth and organization that the Communist, socialist, and Liberal element was in this country in the twenties"; "People of wealth generally do not support our republic, or free enterprise. . . . They are brainwashed by the left-wing slant of most columnists, radio and television commentators, and those daily newspapers who are on the side of the socialists and Communists. . . ."

"Marching Orders" is, you may be sure, carefully written: no reader of the *Progressive* will fail to mistake the good sense for nonsense. W.K.

Pacifism and the Atomic Bomb

The author of this discussion of the atomic menace in relation to civilian morale has published articles on military history in the U.S. and Germany

HANS KARL GUNTHER

Before the first World War, many prominent voices warned that another armed conflict would destroy Western culture. Before the second, numerous statesmen and private citizens—both in the free world and the Axis countries—said that another war would wipe out civilization. Now the prophets of doom are predicting that another major war will mean the end of mankind.

Among a free people such talk is infinitely more dangerous than in a totalitarian country. Under dictatorship, the party line can reverse itself from one day to the next, and the police-state machinery can liquidate the opposition. But in our society, where public opinion is so important, pacifist propaganda is the most valuable ally of our enemies. For if the pacifists can convince enough of us that the very outbreak of war means our destruction, they will have won for our enemies the major battle: the elimination of our will to fight.

A nation's defensive potential is the product of its will to fight and its capacity to produce for war. New super-weapons are always directed mainly against morale. Naval blockades, submarine warfare, poison gas and aerial bombardment were all much more damaging to morale than to warmaking potential. The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were equal in destructive force only to twenty-ton blockbusters of the type often used against German cities. Yet they decided the Japanese —already thinking of capitulating— upon immediate surrender. There is a limit to physical destructiveness. The only absolute in warfare is the concession of defeat. The hydrogen fusion-bomb does not alter that basic fact.

What gives the new super-bomb its special importance is that it further revolutionizes traditional concepts of warfare. Since offense and defense have traditionally moved on the ground, it had generally been assumed (with Clausewitz) that defense was the inherently stronger form of action. The airplane, which made possible "vertical" instead of "horizontal" attack, upset that theory. No longer was it true that defense on a linear front could safeguard a country from destruction, for enemy airplanes could carry their bomb-loads into its hinterland. But the major damage—even in Germany, where destruction from the air was worst—has usually been done by ground forces. And the only reason for the great destruction from the air in Germany was that the German Air Force had been eliminated from the skies and the Allies could send tremendous numbers of sorties against the German industrial cities.

H-Bomb Destruction

The hydrogen bomb introduces still another factor. At least over a limited area, it achieves complete destruction. During World War II many a factory was bombed, the rubble cleared away, the damaged machinery repaired and production resumed. Even a direct hit often did not raze a single building. But the H-bomb pulverizes the immediate area of its explosion. Destruction wrought by H-bombs, therefore, will never be a matter of degree, as was that wrought by conventional bombs. A single super-bomb will do a complete job. Furthermore, it used to be said that not more than 25 per cent of an attacking force of planes were ever shot down. Even if the percentage should be greatly increased with modern radio-guided devices, it is unlikely that such absolute destruction far behind the lines could be prevented. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, of course, would make 100 per cent interception almost impossible. At least there is no device known so far which could prevent a large number of supersonic rockets from reaching their targets.

Since each side in the cold war has long-range bombers that could deliver bombs to the other, and since both are working on intercontinental ballistic missiles, it is therefore predicted that a hot war would be initiated by large-scale destruction. The pertinent questions are: 1) whether the damage will be so great as to paralyze the whole country; 2) whether recovery will be possible; 3) whether civilian morale will hold up sufficiently for the country to survive.

An analysis of existing test data would suggest that popular fears have exaggerated the real menace. Although it would be foolish not to face the fact that any city may now be annihilated by a few bombs, it would be a tragic mistake to believe that atomic attack would spell doom for a country of 3,000,000 square miles. Unprecedented damage might be wrought, but it would constitute a death blow only if the nation surrendered its faith in victory.

The Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombs had a maximal radius of a half-mile of complete destruction. Larger A-bombs have since been made, and reports on them have frightened the public with astronomical figures of TNT-equivalents. But the destructive power of the bomb does not increase in the same ratio as the TNT-equivalent. According to the 1953 report of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, a bomb ten times as potent as that dropped on Hiroshima has a total destructive radius of 1.1 miles; one fifty times as powerful (equivalent to 1,000,000 tons of TNT), a radius of 1.8 miles. Since official statements indicate that the existing H-bombs have TNT-equivalents of "several million tons," a destructive radius of two to three miles may be assumed. Partial damage will be more

far-reaching, though it rapidly becomes less lethal with increasing distance from the explosion's center.

A string of the latest bombs (or missiles), if properly placed, could no doubt destroy the larger part of most cities. If dropped with expert precision and some extravagance, it might eliminate a whole section of the country from the war effort and make it dependent on immediate relief from the rest. No "area-buster" of the type often rumored exists as yet; nor is it likely to exist. A small country, such as several of our European allies, might be knocked out of the war overnight by a surprise attack. But the United States—and the USSR—still possess the most effective defense: that of depth. So do India and China, two potentially first-rate powers. Large countries such as these cannot feasibly be covered by H-bomb attack, though they can be hurt, and if unprepared might be paralyzed.

The concept of defense in depth is only partly obviated by the realities of fall-out publicized during recent years. Fall-out is determined not only by the size of the explosion, but also by wind and weather, and its intensity is dissipated into innocuousness as distance from the explosion increases. It would be an unlikely misfortune if the force and direction of all winds at all air levels were to provide optimum conditions for maximum injurious fall-out at even one point of attack. Moreover, the enemy could probably not calculate fall-out conditions well enough to time his attack accordingly. The greatest importance of fall-out will lie in the reaction of the civilian population, for its unpredictability can easily make it the source of panic.

If the USSR Were Bombed

The USSR is in a much worse situation with regard to H-bomb warfare than the United States. The destruction of its industrial cities would give power back to that arch-enemy of Bolshevism, the Russian peasant. Industries in the Soviet Union, in spite of their much-heralded decentralization, are still concentrated in a few regions: the Moscow area, the Southern Urals, the Donetz Basin, the trans-Baikal region, and the newly-constructed centers on the central Asiatic plateau. Incapacitation of these areas, and the paralysis of a few key railroads, would leave Russian leaders with only a primitive economy, fighting against tremendous distances and popular discontent. In the United States, the existence of small industrial establishments in many small and medium-sized cities would make it possible for the American people to reconstruct their economy even if every one of their great population centers were to be eliminated. The vast stock of transport vehicles and dense network of roads would soon overcome the loss of segments of the transport network. The wide dissemination of a great body of knowledge of machines and technical implements is perhaps the nation's most valuable resource. Moreover, since democracy is at least as much at home in the country as in the city, there would be no political stresses comparable to those ensuing upon destruction in the USSR. In short, on all points of war potential in which America is strong, the USSR lags behind. Communism is favored only by its tight peacetime organization, its initial stock of materials of war—and possibly by defeatism in America.

For, actually, little has been done about the defense of this country against atomic attack. The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) has published instructions on the building of shelters, but as yet very few exist. Whereas the armed forces absorb more than half the entire federal budget, and billions are spent on foreign aid, less than 0.1 per cent of national expenditures goes to the FCDA. The FCDA has helped the states and local governments (whose duty civil defense primarily is) to train nurses, stock medical supplies and fight floods, droughts, hurricanes and other disasters. The President has recommended small increases in the FCDA budgets for the coming years, but there is no reason to believe that civil defense will be taken more seriously in the future than in the past. Some states have developed evacuation plans for their great cities, without tackling the question whether there will be time to evacuate. And the early-warning systems ringing the country are being perfected in the hope of providing advance notice of enemy attack. But the overwhelming majority of U.S. citizens are not at all sure what could or should be done if some day the sirens began to scream and they suddenly heard a dull detonation followed by flames along the horizon. There is the distinct possibility that, not being prepared, they would lose their heads.

Facing Facts

What is needed, along with physical armaments, is mental preparedness. We need to fact the facts; to realize that, although we should be hurt, we could survive, and that we want to survive. The very outbreak of another war need not destroy us unless we are willing to give up. There is no denying that the first days of nuclear warfare would tear great wounds into the body of the nation. But it will depend on our attitude whether that body will bleed to death.

In the long run, the only way to avoid such injuries is to sell out the country to Communism. If we do that, we shall be stripped of our political, spiritual and material way of life and reduced to perpetual slavery; for the Communists always oppress their subject nations, and rob them of intellectual and religious freedom and material possessions. The same consequences would come from yielding after the first bombardment, except that then the hostile soldiery, maddened by war propaganda, would descend upon us and maltreat us, as the Soviet armies have maltreated all conquered populations.

Short of slavery and torture, then, there is no certain way of avoiding the possible ravages of atomic warfare. It may be that skillful diplomacy will avert war until Communism evolves into a higher state of civilization. But that is a conjecture and deals with a possibility controverted by the evidence of history.

Defiance of death, willingness to sacrifice, and the determination to survive are not alien to the American tradition. That spirit lived at Valley Forge, on the battlefields of the Civil War, and wherever American troops have fought and won. The civilian has now advanced to the front ranks. It is up to all of us to prepare ourselves to defend and preserve our heritage.

Germany: Over-Full Employment

One of the world's outstanding economists takes a knowing look at that Keynesian idol, "full employment." It has grown dangerously into over-full employment, he finds

WILHELM ROEPKE

The spectacular economic recovery of Germany is all the more spectacular in contrast with the miserable condition of her truncated eastern part. The German experience is important to the whole world precisely because it shows at once the depths to which a people can sink under a deadly combination of collectivism and "repressed" inflation, and the heights to which it can rise under the reverse economic policy—a policy which puts an end to "repressed" inflation, replaces the "planned" with the market economy, and restores a stable currency. For this last is, in a nutshell, what the famous German reform of 1948 undertook and accomplished.

But it would be wrong to assume that it was simple. It was no mere matter of abolishing controls and reforming the monetary system. On the contrary, the rise of the German economy since 1948 has been due to a number of circumstances among which, paradoxically enough, the continuous influx of refugees from the east has proved especially beneficial.

One of the greatest achievements of German reconstruction has been that it enabled the economy gradually to absorb unemployment without jeopardizing economic equilibrium and monetary stability. There are in Europe three countries that honestly represent the principles of market economy and monetary discipline: Germany, Switzerland and Belgium. And all three have shown that full employment can be achieved without the inflationary policy that goes under the name of "full employment" —the policy that ever since the War has been the political fashion in Great Britain, The Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries.

The greatest blessing of this policy, it seems to me, is evident today when the inflationary boom all over Europe is changing full employment into over-full employment. Germany (and also Switzerland and Belgium) is going through this new phase with a sound and stable monetary system. It can face the perils of the current situation unharassed by the type of inflation which, over the past years, has been the economic curse of Great Britain and other "full employment" countries.

This, for Germany as well as Switzerland and Belgium, has two fortunate consequences. One is that inflation has been considerably less than in most other countries. The second is that Germany, Switzerland and Belgium face the inherent problems of the boom without the additional burden of a weak currency, a deficit in the balance of payments, and the growing inability to balance the fiscal budget. Germany has entered the most dangerous period of inflationary boom with one of the soundest currencies in the world, with great and still increasing reserves of gold and hard currencies, and with the confidence that ensues from such advantages.

The Wage-Price Spiral

This is not to belittle the dangers still ahead. Such dangers, on the whole, are hardly greater in Germany than those which the Swiss or even the Americans must anticipate; still, they are serious enough. Investments tend to outgrow the limits set by genuine savings; and thus in Germany, too, they tend to exert an inflationary pressure on the economy. It is difficult to keep such investments in check, even by applying such high interest rates as are rarely seen in a developed industrial country. Most disquieting, however, in Germany as elsewhere, is the condition of the labor market.

After the past predicament of under-employment, the economy of the West is now badgered by the problem of over-full employment: the demand for labor tends to exceed its supply. This, under the impact of immensely powerful labor unions, makes wages rise beyond the rates determined and justified by the productivity of labor. The consequence is inflation—an inflation of the slow and smoldering type now familiar to all nations (unless, that is, they are going through the still worse variety of "flaming" inflation).

The wage-price spiral keeps pressing into the flesh of the German and Swiss economies, although both countries have been lucky enough to escape, so far, the vicious practice of "index" wages—a European practice that automatically links wages with the official and, of course, constantly rising index of costs of living, and thus makes the wage-price spiral a relentlessly accelerating mechanism.

This situation in Germany, as well as elsewhere, burdens the responsible authorities—that is, primarily, the central bank system—with a well-known dilemma. The German central bank, the *Bank Deutscher Laender* at Frankfurt, could turn off the credit faucet sufficiently, with the instruments at its disposal, to stop the wage-price spiral in order to curtail inflation. But given the automatic wage increases, it could do so only at the price of some noticeable unemployment. In other words, in Germany no less then elsewhere wage increases confront the responsible managers of the national economy with the formidable dilemma of inflation or unemployment. Or to put it differently: it has become increasingly impossible at this particular

point in the development of European prosperity to attain at the same time full employment, further wage increases, and a stable purchasing power of money. One of these three aims has to be sacrificed. And although it is difficult to foresee which one it will be, it is unfortunately not likely that it will be either full employment or wage increases. It will be, I am afraid, monetary stability.

Germans Fear Inflation

The situation appears to be somewhat less dangerous in Germany than in other industrial countries of Europe. And for two reasons. First, two colossal inflations during one single generation in Germany have made the Germans singularly inflation-conscious. And this means that they are more prone than others in Europe to assign priority to monetary stability: the German parliament, the government, the political parties, and the central bank system know only too well that they must not ignore the popular fear of inflation. Second, there is a considerable sense of responsibility and moderation in the German labor unions: they seem, on the whole, more ready than labor unions in Great Britain and the United States to consider the economic realities.

Germany is also very fortunate in that its central bank system enjoys a degree of independence which has become rare in our time of mass democracy. From its beginning, the system has had a president and a board who, by and large, have made the most judicious use of that independence; their manifest purpose has always been strict monetary discipline. In Germany, as well as Switzerland and Belgium, the idea so dear to the advocates of "modern economics"—of using the fiscal budget as a stabilizer (by budgeting in times of inflationary booms for a surplus, and in times of recession for a deficit)—has lost most of its lure in the face of practical experience.

Among other things, we in Europe have found that the pressure of taxation (applied to achieve that surplus) tends to increase investments and thus adds to the inflationary pressures. Furthermore, we realize that given the political framework of mass democracy, it is next to impossible for a government to prevent a surplus from being wiped out by increased expenditures and/or a decrease in taxes.

Asset—and Menace

But the real menace to the economy of all three stable countries, and most of all to that of Germany, lies elsewhere. It comes, paradoxically enough, from one of Germany's great assets, namely: the hardness of its currency, as reflected in the constant surplus of its balance of payments. This, in turn, is due to the vigorous policies of the *Bank Deutscher Laender* which have kept inflationary pressures considerably lower than in most other European countries. But a constant surplus of the balance of payments, although certainly less alarming than a constant deficit, may have serious drawbacks.

And this is what Germany experiences today. This chronic surplus of the balance of payments has become one of the main sources of inflation in Germany itself. It is the fruit of a consistent fight against inflation; but it has brought about a consequent influx of gold and foreign currencies which are being turned into German currency. Thus, inflation is continuously being "imported" from inflation-ridden countries abroad into European countries more determined to insist on monetary stability. The virtuous country is punished by the less virtuous for its audacity in showing resistance to inflation.

The more effectively a country like Germany combats inflation at home by maintaining monetary discipline (while other countries, like France or Great Britain, indulge in it), the more inflation it will import. And by the same token, the more vigorously must it enforce its internal policy of restriction. The question is this: How long can such a situation last, without either the internal price level in Germany being permitted to rise to the level abroad, or the German exchange rate being adjusted to that of other currencies?

However that may be, one thing should be obvious: the Common European Market, which at present is at the center of discussion in Western Europe, must succeed. There is no other solution for Europe's monetary troubles.

(Reprints of Dr. Roepke's article and of Mr. Chamberlain's article on page 201 are available from NATIONAL REVIEW, *211 East 37th St., New York 16, N.Y., at 15¢ each, 100 for $10.00.)*



Kreuttner

"Irregardless how you stimulate purchasing power, it's the same reaction all over: Negativism!"

From the Academy

RUSSELL KIRK

How Big Is a University President?

There is a difference between growth and inflation. Most of our American universities are swollen like balloons today, but they are not great universities. And many of our university presidents similarly are puffed up, but they are not strong presidents.

Dr. Harlan Hatcher assumed the presidency of the University of Michigan about four years ago. That university, in many ways, for a long time has been the most reputable and influential of state universities. It has endured certain vicissitudes in recent years, and it needs a strong and intelligent president to preserve its reputation in this difficult hour. President Hatcher is an historian, an able speaker, and a man of presence. When he came to the university, he spoke out rather courageously against the debasing of fundamental educational disciplines—particularly reading and writing—in the public schools. For this, he was denounced fiercely by an energumen of the Deweyite persuasion who was superintendent of schools at Battle Creek; and though Mr. Hatcher was somewhat oddly silent under this attack, still people thought well of him for daring at all the virulence of the hierarchy of Teachers College, Columbia. He also behaved with prudence and dignity in the discharge of certain Communists or fellow travelers from the staff of the University. All in all, he seemed to be one of the better state university presidents, in a time when many such are either timid or braggart.

But of late President Hatcher has been saying some silly things. We cannot know the heart; yet it is difficult to believe that Dr. Hatcher really puts his faith in this cant. It is true that he is in a difficult situation. In Michigan, an unfortunate and injurious competition has been carried on, for more than a decade, between the old University and the newly-named Michigan State University at East Lansing, formerly called Michigan State College. The latter institution has been trying to excel the former in size, and has competed hotly for appropriations from the state legislature.

A committee appointed by the state legislature is investigating the future of state-financed higher education, including the division of responsibilities; but meanwhile the University and MSU grow inchoately, and the teachers' colleges and other state institutions also are bursting at the seams. The enrollment at the University of Michigan now is 22,000; at Michigan State, 19,000. MSU wants desperately to surpass the University in quantity, though it seems to care little enough about quality. And President Hatcher seems to have been converted to the same quantitative fallacy.

For Dr. Hatcher said, not many weeks ago, "Numerical size is purely relative. What was large yesterday is small today in a growing and maturing nation." He predicted cheerfully that his University would have forty thousand students by 1970. By a curious coincidence—if it is coincidence—a booklet issued by the Du Pont people, defending the vast Du Pont interests, also employs the phrase "size is relative." Possibly Dr. Hatcher found his inspiration in that quarter. If so, he has joined the crowd of superficial "educators" who pretend that the art of education is identical with a manufacturing process, and that a university ought to be a factory turning out an increasing number of units annually.

Now there are limits to the optimum size of many sorts of industrial plants. When those limits are passed, in many industrial undertakings, the law of diminishing returns sets in and efficiency diminishes, until some work of decentralization becomes urgently necessary. This is truer still of universities, and the law of diminishing returns begins to operate discernably when certain fairly narrow limits of enrollment are passed. If there really are many more students eager and able to profit from university studies, then separate institutions should be established to serve their needs; but to let the university swell gigantically out of a professed desire to "educate everybody" is to run the risk of educating nobody decently.

Dr. Robert Hutchins, as I mentioned more than a year ago in these pages, has pointed out forcefully that the University of Chicago, when he was Chancellor, had grown too large to be administered as a single unit, and perhaps too large even for any prudent decentralizing reform. Yet the University of Chicago is small compared with the giants of Michigan.

Any reflective person who has been a university professor, let alone a president, knows that once the enrollment becomes really large, the work of both professor and student declines markedly in quality. Oxford and Cambridge, with some six or seven thousand students each, intelligently complain that they find great difficulty in doing their old appointed work in such swollen conditions. Think, then, of a university with twenty thousand students, or forty thousand. The members of the faculty of a single department cannot know each other properly, not to mention acquaintance with the members of other departments. The control of the university's policies devolves inevitably upon that peculiar order, the university administrators, divorced from the realities of study and teaching. The students become a faceless crowd, with the psychological characteristics of people who move always in mobs. The classes grow large and uninspired, and the examinations are conducted in great auditoriums, by the "objective" method that is death to originality of thought and to literacy.

I hope Dr. Hatcher does not succeed in crowding forty thousand bewildered students into Ann Arbor. I do not think that we want state universities which are big only in the sense of organic bloat. We do require university presidents who are men of stature; but I trust we shall not settle for presidents who are merely bladders of wind.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

A Purpose Outside History

WILLMOORE KENDALL

Forget it often though we do, *the* issue at stake between Conservatives and Liberals is that between Revelation and "Reason." And there are two strategic errors the Conservative must not make in his continuing debate about that issue with the Liberals (I say debate not discussion because the Liberal, as a matter of settled practice, *refuses* to discuss).

The first is to let the Liberal substitute for the real problems as to the status of revealed truth his own question-begging restatements of them—that is, turn the debate into one about "values" or "value-judgments." The second is to compromise his insistence that the status of those truths turns exclusively on whether or not they *were* revealed—directly, by the One God, to His creature man—as the Conservative does when he acquiesces in the Liberal notion that revelation is a matter of "private" "religious" conviction, and so should never be mentioned in polite company. Both errors are now habitual with most American Conservatives; both are fatal to the Conservative cause.

Conservatism has, on such a showing, been poorly served by the political literature of recent decades. The textbooks from which our college students learn what little they are ever to know about politics tacitly equate the separation of church and state with the separation of religion and politics. Revelation, therefore, is never so much as mentioned in them; the "conflict" between Revelation and "Reason" is tacitly resolved in favor of the latter; right becomes anything in the way of law or principle that emerges from the decision-making process laid down in the Constitution; and commitment to the Decalogue is reduced to a "value preference," in the same category with a fondness for Bel Paese cheese.

The rare student who takes an "advanced" course in poltical theory does, to be sure, finally hear of revelation and its possible relevance to politics; but what he learns is that some sinister fellows like Augustine and Thomas Aquinas once tried to "enslave" "Reason" to some alleged truths that had to be accepted because they had been handed down from on high—as also that Modern Man, having seen through the whole notion of truths handed down from on high, is on his own with what Burke calls his "private stock of reason." The Liberals have, in a word, had things all their way.

I am going to resist the temptation to say that this book (*Israel and Revelation*, by Eric Voegelin: Louisiana State University Press, $7.50) will, by reclaiming for revelation its rightful ascendancy over political thought, speedily alter all that, and point modern man down the path that leads to political sanity. The book has yet to meet the test of scholarly criticism in a score of "fields"; it is only the first volume of a five-volume work; many students of politics will refuse to read it, or dismiss it as inconsequential *because* of its attitude toward revealed truth; and before it can have much influence it must change minds that belong to men who would greatly prefer to keep on thinking what they now think, and what their teachers thought before them.

But if the next four volumes prove worthy of this one, if the book's scholarship is as sound as it appears to be, and if erudition and logic and wit and sweet reasonableness can sway men's minds, then I think it might rally the generation of scholar-politicists that *might* rescue modern man from the futility, the fury, and the destructiveness of modern politics. The book offers to Conservatives, in a word, a ray of hope; and it will behoove them to steep themselves in it, to cherish it, and to gird themselves for battle against the Liberal hatchetmen who will as a matter of course be told off to discredit it.

When men establish a government, according to Professor Voegelin, they analogically repeat "the divine creation of the cosmos," and thus, within their existential limitations, participate in the "creation of cosmic order itself." The kind of order they create, therefore, depends upon their relatedness to God, which in turn depends upon a) the extent to which He has revealed Himself to them, and b) the response to His revelation; and from this it follows that, from the political scientist's point of view, the first important event in world history was the leap from mere existence into "con-substantiality with the being of which [man] is a creaturely part"—a leap that occurred with Moses' experience of revelation. For the revelation to Moses—whether an historical, flesh-and-blood Moses or a symbolic representation of Israel's experience of order is, he thinks, inconsequential—was only the beginning of a progressive disclosure of divine will of which the entire Old Testament, correctly read, is an account.

Previous readings of the Old Testament, Professor Voegelin shows us, have been incorrect because the critics have approached it without a theory as to how in his literary creations man "represents" to himself his experience of order. The first task for the scholar-politicist becomes, accordingly, that of developing such a theory, and his second that of reinterpreting the crucial sections of the Old Testament in the light of that theory. So reinterpreted, it takes on new-and ever-deeper meaning as regards the proper ordering of society, and, finally, its deepest meaning,

which is that man—*all* men, not merely the people of Israel, and all men as *individuals,* not *collectivities*—move through History, under God, for a purpose outside History. And, so reinterpreted, it yields up the breath-taking implication that any attempt to order society as if man did *not* live under God, or as if the purpose of ordering society were *within* History, is impious, doomed to be punished by destruction, and so self-defeating. The breath-taking implication, in a word, that all modern political theory is an attempt to square the circle.

In *Israel and Revelation* we have, then, 1) a distillation of wisdom about the ordering of society from sacred scriptures that previous historians of political theory have simply ignored, 2) the articulation and fleshing-out of a theory (the "theory of symbolic forms") that enables us to find political wisdom where before we have seen only cosmology or theology or poetry, 3) an attempt to rescue world history from the chaos of meaninglessness to which, for our generation anyhow, it has been reduced by Spengler and Toynbee, and 4) an invitation to accompany the author on a journey—through the remaining literature of politics—that promises to be the most exciting intellectual adventure of our time. Because of 2), the author mines out of 1) a message that, insofar as one had previously understood it at all, one had associated with the New Testament; enriches it by baring its roots in the fertile soil of experience; and doubly enriches it by showing us how it can have its roots simultaneously in experience and in revelation. For revelation, we understand at the end, is not the less revelation because its truths can be explained "anthropologically"—that is, in terms of the "need" for it generated in man by his history.

To say more than that to the prospective reader of *Israel and Revelation* would be to rob him of one or another of the most unforgettable moments he has ever spent over a book—and to impair the satisfaction, intellectual and aesthetic, with which he will read its concluding lines:

> The Ethiopian eunuch of the queen, sitting on his cart and reading Isaiah, ponders on the passage: "Like a sheep he was led to the slaughter." He inquires of Philip: "Tell me, of whom is the prophet speaking? Of himself, or of someone else?" Then Philip began, . . . and starting from this passage he told him the good news about Jesus.

So let me leave it at that.

Leviathan

Germany in the Twentieth Century, by Edmond Vermeil. 288 pp. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. $5.50

"Himmelhoch jauchzend, zum Tode betruebt" (exulting to heaven, disturbed even to death). These lines in Goethe's "Egmont" seem prophetic of the fate of Germany in the first half of the twentieth century.

After the solid, disciplined, hard-working prosperity of Imperial Germany came the ordeal of the First World War and the agonies of defeat and inflation. After the Second World War's Nazi victories that recalled Napoleon's and carried the swastika from the Pyrenees to the Volga, the Caucasus and the neighborhood of the Pyramids, followed the decline and fall. There is scarcely a parallel in European history for the state of political, military and economic collapse to which Germany was reduced by the end of that war. Yet within a decade the part of Germany which remained on the Western side of the Iron Curtain had achieved an amazing economic recovery and was, after the Soviet Union, the strongest industrial power in Europe.

To compose a political and cultural history of a people that has undergone such vicissitudes of fortune is a challenging but difficult task. By virtue of profound knowledge of the subject Professor Vermeil, a leading French authority on Germany, is excellently qualified for this ambitious assignment. He seems to be familiar with every significant book that has been published in Germany during the period in question, and he often cites magazine articles that are probably familiar to few Germans. He is a reliable guide to the thought of Spengler and Moeller van den Bruck, of Jaspers and Heidegger, of Thomas Mann, Rainer Maria Rilke and Stefan George. He tracks down the cloudy "Nordic" theories of Hitler to such sources as Houston Stewart Chamberlain and Alfred Rosenberg.

As an interpreter of German politics and economics Professor Vermeil is less successful. Sometimes one gets the impression that he is almost burdened with excessive knowledge, in the sense that he does not always see the forest for the trees.

Some of his conclusions are open to question, especially his belief that Hitler was the product of the big German industrialists. Actually, the backbone of Nazi support was the lower middle class. And, as the late F. A. Voigt remarked in his *Unto Caesar,* Hitler's power was so great that he could have beheaded the German industrial magnates with little opposition. No doubt the attitude is natural and understandable in a Frenchman, but Professor Vermeil's apparent horror at German industrial efficiency does seem to lead him at times to cast the German industrial magnates in a rather unrealistic villain's role.

On the other hand, there are passages of admirable perceptiveness, of which the following, written about Hitler's foreign policy, seems to fit equally well the Soviet methods in this field: "The world suddenly found itself face to face with a sort of revolution that was in itself unlimited, in which the most subtle caution and the most brutal audacity were mingled. War became a permanent state, yet it was not real war; peace was maintained, yet it was not a real peace."

Whatever its shortcomings, this is the most successful one-volume treatment of its ambitious theme in English. It is calculated to inspire as well as satisfy curiosity.

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

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Double Life

The Scapegoat, by Daphne du Maurier. 348 pp. New York: Doubleday & Co. $3.95

The reader had best forgive Miss du Maurier in advance for stretching the impersonation theme past the point of credulity. Such forgiveness would amount to an act of faith based upon the excellence of her past performances. It is not unrewarded.

John, a lonely Englishman, is overwhelmed by a sense of failure and futility, of not belonging. A lecturer on French history, he feels that the real meaning of history has escaped him because he has never been "close enough to people." While on holiday in France he meets the physical replica of himself and is tricked into assuming the identity of the ruthless and irresponsible Frenchman, Jean de Gué, who uses him as a scapegoat.

Astonishingly, John is accepted without question as the Comte de Gué and thereupon becomes the head of a family, the owner of a bankrupt business, and the master of a chateau. He finds that he has a reproachful wife, a precocious little daughter, a monstrous mother, a brother and sister who hate him, a couple of mistresses, and several servants. His influence upon all these people, and theirs upon him, presents a psychological study which Miss du Maurier develops with sensitive skill.

Each tense situation is fraught with the constant danger that John's impersonation will be detected. He is faced with the responsibility for Jean de Gué's past mistakes and misdeeds. He must cope with the jealousy, animosity, hatred and affection fostered by him. He must make decisions and solve problems affecting the lives of all those dependent upon him; and it is here that the conflict between John's own character and that of his double is brought most sharply into focus.

If John's early efforts to extricate himself from the dangerous role of scapegoat seem too feeble, it must be remembered that what he most passionately wanted was to lose his own identity and thereby find the courage to go on living. How well he succeeded makes a fascinating story.

FRANCES BECK

REVIEWED IN BRIEF

It Seems Like Yesterday, by H. V. Kaltenborn. 221 pp. Putnam. $5.95

Everything—from Bryan's campaign in 1896 to the Supreme Court's recent decision that the prejudices of sociologists are the supreme law of the land—seems like yesterday to Mr. Kaltenborn. He is a man of serious purpose, but he still regrets that the United States did not play in the League of Nations, thinks that "the saddest thing about the Spanish Civil War" was our failure to supply munitions to the Communists in Madrid, and believes that "Russia has to be for peace." He does hazard one prediction: "In the light of subsequent events even President Eisenhower's meeting with the Russians in Geneva may not stand up in history as a complete success." If you think we made that up, look on p. 142.

Twilight for the Gods, by Ernest Gann. 306 pp. Sloane Associates. $3.95

Mr. Gann, who has profited from a diligent reading of Conrad, has written a novel of rare power and fascination. His subject is the last voyage of the last sailing ship under the American flag. Passengers and crew are realistically portrayed, and the captain is a man whom the reader will not easily forget. But the finest pages are those in which we confront the might of the implacable sea and feel the infinite pathos of a noble tradition that is passing ineluctably away.

Give Us This Day, by Sidney Stewart. 254 pp. Norton. $3.50

Mr. Stewart was conscripted when he was twenty-one, promptly sent to the Philippines, and taken captive on Bataan. Near the end of the war British prisoners found him, the sole survivor of his group, half-conscious in a Japanese prison. His report is a chronicle of fiendish brutality and horror relieved only by the futile heroism of a few men, the stoicism of many, and the unwavering faith of a Catholic priest. Mr. Stewart writes with a stark simplicity that brings the nightmare unforgettably before the eyes of the reader. But when he claims to have reached an understanding of the Japanese, he becomes childish, for despite his sufferings he merely repeats the myths that were crammed into his mind when he was in high school. Everybody is just like everybody else—or would be, if he had a sufficient dose of Progress. While his comrades were starving and freezing about him, he says, "I thought back to the history of Europe at the time of King Henry VIII. It had not been unusual for a lord or lady, displeased with a servant, to have him boiled in oil or pulled apart on the rack." Did no one with an elementary knowledge of history read Mr. Stewart's manuscript before it was handed to the typesetter?

(Reviewed by Revilo Oliver)

The Guardians, by J. I. M. Stewart. 285 pp. Norton. $1.35

Oxford is both the last home of lost causes and the inevitable setting for such polite caricatures as Beerbohm's *Zuleika Dobson* and Jean Fayard's *Oxford et Margaret.* Late comers in this tradition must perforce try to serve stronger wine than their predecessors, and Mr. Stewart has spiked the port of satire with the raw alcohol of the merely grotesque. The mixture will probably seem vulgar to connoisseurs of Oxonian fiction, but it is certain to promote hilarity.

Tarheel Talk: An Historical Study of the English Language in North Carolina to 1860, by Norman E. Eliason. 324 pp. University of North Carolina. $5.00

A painstaking study of private letters, diaries, and documents yields a rich harvest of misspellings and solecisms, a meager gleaning of picturesque words and phrases. We are led to the not astonishing conclusion that everyone wrote as well as he could within the limits fixed by his education. An item of intrinsic interest is a letter written in 1838 by a man who was teaching in a college in Alabama and indignantly reported, "We have had applications [for admission] from persons not only without a word of Greek, but actually unable to parse [an] English sentence."

To the Editor

Recognition of Red China

I concur with and approve of your editorial in the February 16 issue of the NATIONAL REVIEW entitled "Mr. Reston's Phony Fight."

However, there is one aspect of the treatment given by those opposing the recognition of Communist China and its admission as a member of the UN which has not been sufficiently stressed, in my opinion. Whether or not recognition signifies approval it certainly does signify the absence of disapproval. Throughout the world those who yearn for concrete expressions and indications of disapproval are bound to have their hope blasted by such recognition.

ADM. CHARLES M. COOKE (RET.)
Sonoma, Cal.

The "Great Debate"

It is because I perhaps sense, and certainly share, Mr. Burnham's feeling of utter futility as he watches present events that I rise to his defense, admitting first that my initial reaction was identical to that of your three dissenters.

Mr. Burnham believes in several basic premises which appear to me as follows: The Communist apparatus is, indeed, out to conquer the world through any and all means possible. Proceeding from this assumption, we are now actually engaged in the "Third World War," regardless of the absence of shooting, and we must win this war or be ourselves destroyed. And the sooner we pursue a policy of active *offense* (operating through such guises as may be deemed necessary), the quicker we will win the war.

At this point the erudite Mr. Burnham departs from his colleagues, and I with him, for I think he sees the key to the situation; that regardless of our high and hard anti-Communist principles, *something* must be done to start that offensive *now* which means a course of action acceptable to the present Administration. With the world situation constantly deteriorating, we cannot wait for national sentiment to change in favor of more principled and vigorous policies.

I hope that this Great Debate will be pursued farther. At the same time, let us have Mr. Burnham's critics match his realism—which is a touchstone of conservatism as I know it.

Arlington, Va. WILLIAM C. WEBER, JR.

James Burnham, in "Liberation: What Next?" puts the best face possible on the agitation now current for a mutual withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe of the armed forces of the Atlantic powers and the USSR plus the neutralizing of that broad belt. I would not reproach Mr. Burnham with the other protagonists of the doctrine of disengagement. There is a valid argument for disengagement and Mr. Burnham has made it more persuasively than its liberal advocates.

The fact that the lightning reconquest of Hungary illustrates the proximity of Soviet border barracks to the satellites deals the argument a tangible blow. The further disquieting demonstration in Hungary (as in Poland) that the Kremlin will not, possibly cannot, tolerate any repudiation of the imperial tie likewise detracts from the case for withdrawing United States, British and French forces from free Germany.

My quarrel with Mr. Burnham's thesis rests, however, on narrower grounds. At the conclusion of his article, he offers his policy as the sole solution of the Eastern European and German questions open to the West. As Mr. Burnham sees it, the "hard anti-Communists" are as sterile as the "soft non-Communists" in making capital of the perplexities and strains put upon Moscow by Hungary, Poland and the existence of Titoism apart from Tito himself.

I beg leave to differ. The fact that the United States government at the head of the West found itself timid and wholly ineffectual in the face of the Eastern European convulsions does not imply that it was without means to take advantage of a providentially opened situation.

The weapons, both diplomatic and economic, were plentifully at hand. Only the will was lacking; a will vitiated perhaps by fear of atomic warfare, by a generalized pacifism or by a profound ignorance of the dynamics of Soviet imperialism. Or by the frightening possibility that another thesis put forth by the disengagement cult, a parcelling of the earth into spheres of influence by the super-powers, has found lodgement in the thinking of the palace guard.

NATIONAL REVIEW has dealt with the "hard" alternatives to conciliation of a Kremlin which, by the terms of its mystique, cannot be conciliated.

We could, and should, have denied recognition to the post-Nagy, Kádár Quisling regime. We could, as we did with Berlin in 1938 after Hitler's purges of Nazis, have conspicuously withdrawn our ambassador from Moscow. We should have pressed the case against Soviet Russia in the UN to the point of expulsion as was done at the League of Nations when Soviet Russia invaded Finland. We should have appealed to the Hungarian peace treaty.

Alternatives? We might by affirmative action short of war, have energized and united the non-Soviet world, given it new purpose, will and meaning. Our government elected to distract itself with the "aggressions" of the Anglo-French-Israeli forces in Egypt.

It seems to me that in this regard Mr. Burnham has overstated his case.

Washington, D.C. FORREST DAVIS

Those who accuse James Burnham of abandoning the "old" Burnham line for the line of the "more intelligent left" didn't understand the old Burnham and now don't understand the new.

The Burnham of *The Struggle for the World, The Coming Defeat of Communism,* and *Containment or Liberation?* reasoned from the premise that Communism, with its headquarters in Moscow, had as its objective a monopoly of world power. And, Mr. Burnham went on, the task of the West is to a) halt the advance of Communist power and b) oust it from positions it now holds. These were, it seems to me, the only fixed "musts" in the old Burnham line. . . .

Now Mr. Burnham is simply proposing that the West seize the opportunity to bring about a contraction of Soviet power. Taking into account the price to be paid—neutralization

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

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of West Germany—the West would, *on balance*, be stronger *vis-à-vis* the enemy after the deal than before.

Mr. Burnham did not say the deal would mean the end of Soviet power. He said the deal *might* mean the end of Soviet power *if the West follows through—i.e.*, the West's task would be easier. . . . Since ultimate Soviet defeat *does not follow as a matter of course* from Soviet withdrawal from the satellites, but only if the West presses its advantage, the Soviets might very well pull out, intending to return later.

Our job will be to see that they never recover power in Eastern Europe, but rather that they shall find themselves always in trouble and always obliged to seek a solution to their problems by yielding power. . . .

New York City AARON BROWN

My respect for James Burnham is the highest but I must side with Frank Meyer and William Schlamm in the debate over neutralization of Central Europe. I especially liked Mr. Meyer's " 'New Ideas' or Old Truth"; specifically, I was impressed by his quick dissection of the consequences of Eisenhower's first axiom that "war is unthinkable."

Denver, Col. J. S. ELMORE

Israeli Aggression?

Your brief editorial on Israel [February 16] is malicious and utterly unjust.

Will you please identify the "aggressions against the Arabs" which you claim Israel perpetrated? If "aggressions" were perpetrated, and of course they were, the guilty ones in every case were the Arab nations and leaders who have been waging a continuous war against Israel from the day that the United Nations decreed its existence. While you certainly have a great antipathy for Nasser, obviously you hate Israel more.

Brooklyn, N.Y. RABBI THEODORE N. LEWIS

Comprehension

. . .Mr. Schlamm's criticism of modern cultural exemplars and political critiques have an emotional flow and feeling that often touch the soul. He possesses the spirit of tragedy, a comprehension of the flux of Western culture in our era, which few possess

College Point, N.Y. JOHN FRANCIS KREBS



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

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